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Would California Survive the MOVE Act?: 
A Preemption Analysis of Employee 
Noncompetition Law 
Phillip D. Thomas† 
ABSTRACT 
Employers use noncompete clauses at all levels of employment, from executives to 
managers to delivery drivers. Such agreements allow employers to protect their 
business interests like trade secrets, customer contact lists, and investments in em-
ployee training. But restrictions on mobility could disproportionately impact low-
wage employees. Moreover, enforcement of noncompetition agreements varies 
widely throughout the states, with some states favoring enforcement and other 
states, like California, broadly prohibiting noncompetition agreements. 
 
In 2015, United States Senators Chris Murphy and Al Franken introduced a bill 
that federally prohibits employers from requiring low-wage employees to enter into 
covenants not to compete, the Mobility and Opportunity for Vulnerable Employees 
(MOVE) Act. Although a statutory prohibition like California’s seems facially rec-
oncilable with the MOVE Act, the scope of prohibitions encompassed by each stat-
ute are far apart. Therefore, if the MOVE Act or similar federal legislation were 
passed, it would preempt California law because the state’s broad prohibition 
would conflict with the Act’s balancing of employer and employee interests and 
would nullify the Act’s remedial structure. 
INTRODUCTION 
For years, covenants not to compete only appeared in the employ-
ment contracts for highly skilled or highly paid employees. But in the 
last two decades, employers have begun adding noncompete clauses to 
a wide array of employment arrangements that include non-skilled and 
 
 † B.A. 2005, The University of Chicago; J.D. Candidate 2018, The University of Chicago Law 
School. I would like to thank Professor Aziz Huq for his invaluable insights and guidance, as well 
as Legal Forum board and staff for advice in developing and editing this Comment. 
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low-wage laborers.1 For example, the sandwich chain Jimmy John’s re-
quires all employees to sign a broad covenant not to compete.2 Although 
Jimmy John’s may not seek to enforce this agreement against low-level 
employees like delivery drivers, these employees must, nonetheless, 
agree to the clause. It therefore restricts their legal right to enter into 
numerous engagements after leaving Jimmy John’s.3 
Low-wage employees do not typically have access to the kind of in-
formation that employers want to protect from competitors. Enforce-
ment of noncompetition agreements against low-wage employees, then, 
can unduly restrict their freedom and impact their livelihoods without 
the usual trade-offs of skills training, promotion to managerial roles, 
better wages and benefits, and other incentives to remain with the em-
ployer. Such restrictive covenants have therefore garnered the atten-
tion of both Illinois and New York attorneys general,4 lawmakers,5 and 
the Obama Administration.6 
 
 1 See Steven Greenhouse, Noncompete Clauses Increasingly Pop Up in Array of Jobs, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/09/business/noncompete-clauses-increas 
ingly-pop-up-in-array-of-jobs.html [https://perma.cc/6XN7-MFW3] (describing a growth in the use 
of noncompete agreements in employment arrangements that include interns, lawn-care workers, 
and entry-level positions); Sophie Quinton, These Days, Even Janitors Are Being Required to Sign 
Non-Compete Clauses, U.S.A. TODAY (May 27, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017 
/05/27/noncompete-clauses-jobs-workplace/348384001/ [https://perma.cc/AZE3-TG95] (same). 
 2 Dave Jamieson, Jimmy John’s Makes Low-Wage Workers Sign ‘Oppressive’ Noncompete 
Agreements, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/13/jimmy-
johns-non-compete_n_5978180.html [https://perma.cc/W4ST-VDBQ]. 
 3 See id. (recognizing that “[e]ven if the clause failed to hold up in court, the very possibility 
of limited employment opportunities could dissuade certain workers from rocking the boat,” 
“like . . . trying to unionize”); Quinton, supra note 1 (noting that “[f]or the average worker, having 
the contract is what drives most of the behavior,” even if its terms are unenforceable). 
 4 Jonathan L. Israel, State Attorneys General on the Attack Against Noncompete Overuse, LAB. 
& EMP. L. PERSP. (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.laboremploymentperspectives.com/2016/08/15/state 
-attorneys-general-on-the-attack-against-noncompete-overuse/ [https://perma.cc/XAN2-B84L]. 
 5 Geoff Toy, Putting the Brakes on Jimmy John’s: Bill Banning Non-Compete Agreements for 
Low-Wage Employees Introduced in Congress, BERMAN FINK VAN HORN P.C. (July 9, 2015), 
http://www.bfvlaw.com/putting-the-brakes-on-jimmy-johns-bill-banning-non-compete-agreements 
-for-low-wage-employees-introduced-in-congress-3/ [https://perma.cc/6ZQC-EHSB]. 
 6 State Call to Action on Non-Compete Agreements, OBAMAWHITEHOUSE.ARCHIVES.GOV 
(2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/competition/noncompetes-calltoac 
tion-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/SH44-MBAX] (calling on “state policymakers to . . . reduce the mis-
use of non-compete agreements”); OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, NON-
COMPETE CONTRACTS: ECONOMIC EFFECTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 26 (2016), https:// 
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/economic-policy/Documents/UST%20Non-competes%20Report. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/JB3P-E38L] [hereinafter TREASURY REPORT] (noting that “a growing body of 
evidence suggests that” noncompete clauses “are frequently used in ways that are inimical to the 
interests of workers and the broader economy”). 
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Although restrictive covenants were generally disfavored as “re-
straints of trade” under English common law,7 the enforceability of cov-
enants not to compete varies widely throughout the United States.8 
Most states examine noncompetition agreements under a reasonable-
ness test that usually requires the clause be “reasonably tailored in 
scope, geography, and time to further a protectable interest of the em-
ployer.”9 Some states, however, provide strong statutory prohibitions 
against the use of covenants not to compete in the employment context. 
California is one of those states. California Business & Professions Code 
§ 16600 invalidates nearly all noncompetition agreements in employ-
ment contracts.10 
In an attempt to provide uniformity to the assorted state regimes 
and, specifically, to protect low-wage employees against restrictions of 
their mobility, United States Senators Al Franken and Chris Murphy 
have proposed the Mobility and Opportunity for Vulnerable Employees 
(MOVE) Act.11 If Congress were to pass the MOVE Act, the statute 
would prohibit employers from requiring employees below a certain pay 
level to enter into noncompete agreements, require notice of the prohi-
bition to be displayed in the workplace, and require disclosure of non-
 
 7 Michael Selmi, Trending and the Restatement of Employment Law’s Provisions on Employee 
Mobility, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1369, 1376 (2015) (quoting Outsource Int’l, Inc. v. Barton, 192 F.3d 
662, 669 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J., dissenting)). 
 8 See Norman D. Bishara, Fifty Ways to Leave Your Employer: Relative Enforcement of Cove-
nants Not to Compete, Trends, and Implications for Employee Mobility Policy, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 
751, 771–79, 786–87 fig.1 (2011) [hereinafter Bishara, Enforcement]. Bishara created a noncom-
pete agreement enforceability index for all fifty states and the District of Columbia by applying 
scores to the results presented in COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE, A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (Brian 
M. Malsberger ed., 6th ed. 2008 & Supp. 2009) [hereinafter Malsberger, SURVEY]. 
 9 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.06 (2016). 
 10 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (2016) (voiding all contracts “by which anyone is restrained 
from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business”). 
 11 S. 1504, 114th Cong. (2015). The bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Health, Ed-
ucation, Labor, and Pensions and then stalled. S.1504 - MOVE Act, https://www.congress. 
gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/1504/committees [https://perma.cc/2J7R-87TS]. A similar bill 
stalled at the subcommittee stage in the same session of the House of Representatives. Freedom 
for Workers to Seek Opportunity Act, H.R. 4254, 114th Cong. (2015), https://www.congress. 
gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/4254/committees [https://perma.cc/7BFE-E3UB]. Both federal 
bills proposed nearly identical language. Moreover, Illinois recently enacted strikingly similar leg-
islation. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 90/1, 5, 10 (2017); see also Naureen Amjad, Illinois Employers Pro-
hibited from Requiring Low-Wage Employees to Execute Non-Compete Agreements, PEDERSON & 
HOUPT: NEWS & ALERTS, https://www.pedersenhoupt.com/newsroom-alerts-40.html (Jan. 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/3UVP-5T5A]. The controversiality of restraining low-wage worker mobility with 
noncompetition clauses has not dissipated. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, Companies Compete but Won’t Let 
Their Workers Do the Same, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/04/opin 
ion/noncompete-agreements-workers.html [https://perma.cc/K2CJ-QELW] (writing strong criti-
cism of noncompetition agreements). If Congress addresses the issue in the future, all of these bills 
show that legislators will probably use language similar to the MOVE Act. Therefore, while this 
Comment addresses the MOVE Act specifically, the analysis may have broader applications. 
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compete clauses early in the hiring process if the agreement is not oth-
erwise prohibited by the Act. The MOVE Act and the California statute 
appear facially compatible because both laws seek to limit the use of 
restrictive covenants. But the scope of the prohibitions in each statute 
are far apart. Therefore, it is not clear which law would prevail in a 
California controversy involving noncompetition agreements. 
This Comment argues that the MOVE Act would preempt § 16600 
because California’s broad prohibition of restrictive covenants would 
disrupt the fundamental policy judgments and remedial structures ev-
ident in the federal Act. Part I of this Comment examines the reasona-
bleness test employed by most states, as well as the typical dimensions 
along which state policies vary. This is followed by a review of the law 
under California’s statutory prohibition and an explanation of the pro-
posed MOVE Act. Part II of this Comment advances a reading that il-
lustrates the Act’s objectives of balancing employer interests with em-
ployee mobility and discusses the remedies that would be available 
under the Act’s enforcement provisions. Contrasting these aspects of 
the federal law with California law, the Comment concludes that the 
MOVE Act would preempt § 16600. 
I. THE LAWS GOVERNING EMPLOYMENT NONCOMPETITION 
AGREEMENTS 
A. A Mosaic of State Laws and the Reasonableness Test 
As clauses in employment contracts, employees could challenge 
noncompete clauses with traditional contract doctrines like unconscion-
ability. But such challenges are rare in practice. When examining re-
strictive covenants in the employment context, courts typically carry 
the traditional contract analysis only up to the point of looking for con-
sideration.12 If the court finds the employment contract supported by 
consideration, it then turns to a reasonableness test to weigh the inter-
ests of the employer against the breadth of restrictions imposed on the 
employee. Many jurisdictions also espouse an additional requirement 
to ensure that the restrictive covenant is not contrary to public interest, 
but this component is not frequently used.13 States answer each of these 
questions differently, though: What are reasonable restrictions on an 
 
 12 See Selmi, supra note 7, at 1381 (characterizing consideration analysis as preliminary to 
examining the noncompete clause itself, but also noting that this area of law is changing). 
 13 See Bishara, Enforcement, supra note 8, at 757 (noting the lack of a “truly uniform ap-
proach,” yet recognizing a building consensus in the formulation of the reasonableness test). See 
also RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.06 cmt.i (2016) (explaining that the public interest 
prong is rarely used). 
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employee’s post-employment activities? What is a protectable employer 
interest? And what counts as consideration? The inquiry is ultimately 
fact-intensive, and the outcomes certainly vary from state to state, cre-
ating a mosaic of noncompete agreement enforceability throughout the 
country.14 
1. States vary in determining reasonableness and recognizing 
protectable interests 
California’s broad prohibition of noncompetition agreements is 
rare. Moreover, the standard used by most states is flexible, and the 
differences in application are numerous.15 While it is beyond the scope 
of this Comment to scrutinize the breadth of judicial variation, courts 
are in accord on the factors involved in determining whether a noncom-
pete clause is reasonable or overly broad: (1) the scope of prohibited ac-
tivities, as well as the extent of the restriction in (2) time and (3) geog-
raphy. Courts also agree that those factors must be tailored to the 
business interests of the employer, but they disagree on what consti-
tutes a legitimate, protectable interest.16 
States are mostly aligned in the analysis of whether the restricted 
activities are reasonable in scope, which is arguably the most important 
factor. Whatever conduct the noncompete clause prohibits a former em-
ployee from engaging in must be tied to the interest the employer is 
seeking to protect and to the scope of the employer’s business in the first 
place. Even states with strong enforcement regimes will tend to reject 
noncompete clauses that forbid employment of “any capacity within any 
entity that provides [like] services” if that broad restriction is not lim-
ited to a concern for competing business activities and founded in oth-
erwise protectable interests.17 
Whether the geographic and durational restrictions are permissi-
ble, however, varies from case to case and from court to court. For ex-
ample, what makes a duration reasonable can depend on the interest 
the employer intends to protect and the scope of activities being prohib-
ited.18 But jurisdiction itself also matters. States that favor enforcement 
 
 14 See Bishara, Enforcement, supra note 8, at 787 fig.2 (grouping noncompete enforceability 
rankings derived by scoring cases provided in Malsberger, SURVEY, supra note 8). 
 15 See generally Malsberger, SURVEY, supra note 8. 
 16 See RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.06 (2016) (restrictive covenants in employment 
agreements must be “reasonably tailored in scope, geography, and time to further a protectable 
interest of the employer”). 
 17 Merryfield Animal Hosp. v. MacKay, 33 Conn. L. Rptr. 554, 554 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 
2002) (rejecting restriction that would keep veterinarian from working at another facility that 
treats completely different animals) (emphasis omitted). 
 18 See, e.g., Avalon Legal Info. Servs., Inc. v. Keating, 110 So. 3d 75, 82 (Fla. Ct. App. 2013) 
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are likely to uphold lengthier restraints, while less favorable states will 
demand briefer constraints.19 
Although similarly varied, the inquiry into geographic scope typi-
cally involves a discrete formulation. Courts look to the geographic 
reach of the employer’s business to determine if the restriction is tai-
lored accordingly. Local or regional employers cannot reasonably enjoin 
a former employee from working throughout an entire nation or, in 
more stringent states, beyond the employer’s own market.20 States also 
disagree on whether a national or international employer may enforce 
a restriction of the same scope—or, conversely, whether far-reaching 
restrictions are simply too broad to be overcome with a legitimate inter-
est regardless of the expansiveness of the employer’s market.21 
In addition to the three prongs of the reasonableness test, nearly 
all courts require that an employer articulate a legitimate interest to be 
balanced against the former employee’s restrictions. Although courts 
differ widely in what they consider protectable employer interests, the 
realm of protectable interests is concrete. All states consider trade se-
crets and the employee’s duty of loyalty to be protectable interests.22 
The next most recognized interests include confidential information 
and developed customer lists. Behind those are firm goodwill, non-so-
licitation of other employees, and customer contacts. Only the states 
with the strongest enforcement regimes recognize customer goodwill 
 
(upholding a three-year restriction on customer solicitation to protect client relationships and 
goodwill); Selmer Co. v. Rinn, 789 N.W.2d 623, 630–31 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010) (upholding a one-year 
restriction on customer solicitation to protect customer base); Sys. and Software, Inc. v. Barnes, 
886 A.2d 762, 766 (Vt. 2005) (upholding a six-month restriction on competitive employment to 
protect confidential information). 
 19 See Bishara, Enforcement, supra note 8, at 787 fig.2 (Wisconsin and Vermont are far apart 
in the enforceability rankings at, respectively, 41 (moderate-to-weak) and 15 (moderate-to-strong), 
and Florida has the strongest enforceability ranking of 1.). 
 20 Compare Cambridge Eng’g, Inc. v. Mercury Partners 90 BI, Inc., 879 N.E.2d 512, 523–24 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (rejecting a geographic restriction covering all of Canada when employer did 
not do business in all provinces), with Jaraki v. Cardiology Assocs. of Ne. Ark., P.A., 55 S.W.3d 
799, 804 (Ark. Ct. App. 2001) (rejecting a 75-mile radius restriction that included a large market 
that was not a part of the employer’s business). See also Bishara, Enforcement, supra note 8, at 
787 fig.2 (Illinois has a strong enforceability ranking of 4, and Arkansas has a weak ranking of 
49.). 
 21 Compare Unlimited Opportunity, Inc. v. Waadah, 861 N.W.2d 437, 444 (Neb. 2015) (reject-
ing a restriction as unlimited because it covered all of the employer’s “multi-state and interna-
tional” territory), with Sylvan R. Shemitz Designs, Inc. v. Brown, No. AANCV136013145S, 2013 
WL 6038263, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 23, 2013) (finding a restriction reasonable when it pro-
hibits employment in the entire United States). See also Bishara, Enforcement, supra note 8, at 
787 fig.2 (Connecticut has a strong enforceability ranking of 3, and Nebraska has a weak ranking 
of 44.). 
 22 Trade secrets and the duty of loyalty may also be protected outside the context of a noncom-
pete clause. See RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.01–8.05 (2016). Even California provides 
these protections though it has a statutory ban on noncompetition agreements in the employment 
context. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600–07 (2016). 
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and the employer’s investment in employee training as protectable in-
terests.23 
2. States can be grouped into four categories according to their 
general policies regarding restrictive covenants 
The contextual nature of the reasonableness test leads courts to 
produce different outcomes even when they characterize the analysis in 
the same manner. When this happens within a single jurisdiction, the 
facts of the cases usually explain the discrepancy.24 Across jurisdictions, 
though, there is an additional significant backdrop: the states approach 
covenants not to compete from different policy standpoints, setting the 
stage for contrasting analyses that can be traced back to each state’s 
default position. Indeed, those default positions have been categorized 
into four distinct groups25 and measured quantitatively according to a 
survey of outcomes.26 The latter provided the basis for deeming a state 
to be either a strong or weak enforcement regime in the preceding sec-
tion. The former might help explain the major stances that contribute 
to that variation. 
Although the laws governing noncompete clauses have developed 
from common law in nearly every state, a significant number of states 
have enacted relevant legislation.27 Generally, though, the statutes cod-
ify the common law reasonableness test, with only a few states provid-
ing guidance on employing the test.28 Three particular exceptions stand 
out and constitute the first group. California and North Dakota statu-
torily ban covenants not to compete in the employment context.29 In 
fact, these states rank fifty and fifty-one, respectively, on Bishara’s en-
forceability index, meaning they rarely, if ever, enforce employment 
 
 23 See Bishara, Enforcement, supra note 8, at 774–75; Norman D. Bishara, Covenants Not to 
Compete in a Knowledge Economy: Balancing Innovation from Employee Mobility Against Legal 
Protection for Human Capital Investment, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 287, 315 & fig.1A (2006) 
[hereinafter Bishara, Economy]. 
 24 But see Bishara, Enforcement, supra note 8, 786–87 fig.1 (showing that between 1991 and 
2009, the enforceability rankings of Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, and Vermont changed by over 20 
points, suggesting that some jurisdictional differences may be explained by policy developments). 
 25 See Selmi, supra note 7, at 1375–80 (grouping the states into categories based on policy). 
 26 See Bishara, Enforcement, supra note 8, at 772–80 (using the Malsberger, SURVEY, supra 
note 8, to create an enforceability index for all 50 states and the District of Columbia). 
 27 Compare Bishara, Economy, supra note 23, at 322 fig.3 (showing that sixteen states had 
legislation in 2006), with Bishara, Enforcement, supra note 8, at 778 (showing that eighteen states 
had legislation in 2011). 
 28 See Kenneth R. Swift, Void Agreements, Knocked-Out Terms, and Blue Pencils: Judicial 
and Legislative Handling of Unreasonable Terms in Noncompete Agreements, 24 HOFSTRA LAB. & 
EMP. L.J. 223, 243–44 (2007) (discussing statutes that address employment noncompete clauses). 
 29 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600–07 (2016); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2016). 
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noncompete clauses.30 Colorado also has broad statutory restrictions on 
employment noncompetition agreements.31 
In contrast, some states favor freedom of contract and look at cov-
enants not to compete under that traditional lens rather than through 
the reasonableness test. The prime example in this group is Texas. In 
Marsh USA Inc. v. Cook,32 the Supreme Court of Texas emphasized the 
state’s constitutional protection of the freedom of contract33 and state 
legislation that provides that “a covenant not to compete is enforceable 
if it is ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforceable agreement.”34 
Even when a statute in a state like Texas permits only reasonable re-
straints, the courts begin their examination of what is reasonable from 
a position that favors enforcement.35 
The majority of states fall into two other distinct categories. On one 
hand, there are states that expressly disfavor noncompete clauses, and, 
on the other hand, there are states that are generally neutral regarding 
their enforcement.36 The former—the hostile states—explain the policy 
as one that favors an employee’s mobility more than the interest an em-
ployer has in preventing competition by a former employee, which is 
generally disfavored as a “restraint of trade.”37 This group includes 
states that are not usually employee-friendly, like Montana, Tennessee, 
and Virginia, as well as numerous states that are home to large and 
growing commercial centers, like New York, Illinois, and Georgia.38 
The final group of states—the neutral states—expresses their po-
sition as one seeking to balance the interests of both employer and em-
ployee.39 This set is smaller than the hostile group, and, to the chagrin 
of an outsider, states will at times embrace both hostility and neutrality 
simultaneously.40 Perhaps the best and clearest example of this group 
 
 30 See Bishara, Enforcement, supra note 8, at 774, 778, 786–87 fig.1. 
 31 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-113 (2016) (Notably, Colorado also allows for the recovery of 
education and training costs if an employee worked for the employer for less than two years.). 
 32 354 S.W.3d 764 (Tex. 2011). 
 33 TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 16 (2016). 
 34 Covenants Not to Compete Act (CNCA), TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 15.50(a). See also Marsh 
USA Inc., 354 S.W.3d at 775 (interpreting the language of the CNCA). 
 35 See Selmi, supra note 7, at 1379 (stating that “the position of the Supreme Court of Texas . . . 
is not where most jurisdictions start from”). 
 36 See id. at 1379–80. 
 37 See, e.g., Murfreesboro Med. Clinic, P.A. v. Udom, 166 S.W.3d 674, 678 (Tenn. 2005) (ex-
plaining that “covenants not to compete are disfavored . . . a restraint of trade, and as such, are 
construed strictly in favor of the employee”); Purchasing Assocs., Inc. v. Weitz, 196 N.E.2d 245, 
247 (N.Y. 1963) (explaining that “powerful considerations of public policy . . . militate against 
sanctioning the loss of a man’s livelihood”). 
 38 See Selmi, supra note 7, at 1379–80. 
 39 See id. 
 40 See, e.g., Hess v. Gebhard & Co., Inc., 808 A.2d 912, 917, 920 (Pa. 2002) (stating both that 
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is Missouri.41 In Whelan Sec. Co. v. Kennebrew,42 the Missouri Supreme 
Court unequivocally stated that the “law of non-compete agreements in 
Missouri seeks to balance the competing concerns” of employer invest-
ments in training, customers, and trade secrets with the employee’s de-
sire for mobility to “provide for their families and advance their ca-
reers.”43 A neutral court like Missouri will ultimately “enforce a non-
compete agreement if it is demonstratively reasonable.”44 
To the extent that these groups represent a spectrum relating pol-
icy to enforcement, they do not necessarily align with Bishara’s enforce-
ability index. For example, while Colorado has enacted a broad prohibi-
tion against noncompete clauses, it has a moderate enforcement 
ranking of 26, far from the bottom of 51. Similarly, Texas’s favoring of 
the freedom of contract is hardly clear from its enforceability ranking 
of 32, and Illinois’s apparent hostility is controverted by an enforceabil-
ity ranking of 4.45 It is unclear what exactly accounts for these differ-
ences.46 But the disparity demonstrates that enforceability is not reduc-
ible to simple categorizations of state policy, nor vice versa, even when 
expressly enacted as legislation. 
B. California’s Prohibition against Contracts in Restraint of Trade 
Save for a handful of exceptions, in California “every contract by 
which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, 
or business of any kind is to that extent void.”47 The exceptions gener-
ally cover the sale or dissolution of corporations, partnerships, and lim-
ited liability corporations.48 Covenants not to compete that appear in 
employment contracts fit squarely within this statutory prohibition.49 
 
“restrictive covenants are not favored in Pennsylvania” and that “this Court requires the applica-
tion of a balancing test”). 
 41 See Selmi, supra note 7, at 1380 (using Missouri as the example for the neutral group). 
 42 379 S.W.3d 835 (Mo. 2012). 
 43 Id. at 841. 
 44 Id. 
 45 See Bishara, Enforcement, supra note 8, at 787 fig.2. Illinois has since enacted the Freedom 
to Work Act, which requires an employee be paid at least $13 per hour to be restrained by a non-
competition agreement. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 90/1, 5, 10 (2017). 
 46 It is worth noting that this is not the only divergence between Selmi’s and Bishara’s anal-
yses. Selmi contends that a trend is growing toward heightened scrutiny and invalidation of non-
compete clauses, while Bishara contends that there have been only minor changes in the enforce-
ment regimes, save for a few states that do not represent a trend. 
 47 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (2016). 
 48 See id. §§ 16601–02.5. 
 49 See Richmond Techs., Inc. v. Aumtech Bus. Sols., No. 11-CV-02460-LHK, 2011 WL 2607158, 
at *16 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2011) (quoting Edwards v. Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 291 (Cal. 2008)) 
(noting, “[t]oday in California, covenants not to compete are void, subject to several exceptions”). 
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Like most other states, California initially permitted covenants not 
to compete. But in 1872 the California legislature “rejected the common 
law ‘rule of reasonableness’” typically applied to noncompetition agree-
ments and enacted a statute that “settled public policy in favor of open 
competition.”50 Engaging the broader debates about competition, em-
ployment markets, and freedom of contract are outside the scope of this 
Comment, but it is clear that California’s position is that restrictive cov-
enants hinder employee mobility.51 The purpose of § 16600 is to protect 
employees by “ensur[ing] ‘that every citizen shall retain the right to 
pursue any lawful employment and enterprise of their choice.’”52 
Resolution of a § 16600 violation depends on the circumstances of 
the case and complaint made. That chapter of the California Business 
& Professions Code does not expressly grant any cause of action, define 
a compensable injury, or provide for a civil penalty.53 It simply provides 
that the agreement is void. Instead, plaintiffs must rely on causes of 
action that penalize unlawful conduct and thus provide a catchall mech-
anism for prosecuting other statutory violations. For example, Cal. Bus. 
& Prof. Code Div. 7, Pt. 2, Ch. 5 is dedicated to the enforcement of unfair 
competition laws.54 It mostly requires that violations be prosecuted by 
a public official, but it also creates a cause of action for a private party 
“who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a 
result of the unfair competition.”55 Because unfair competition is de-
fined “to include any unlawful . . . business act,”56 this scheme provides 
a hook for violations of § 16600. 
Loss of an employment opportunity may not be a straightforward 
claim of injury in fact due to unfair competition.57 But such a loss goes 
to the heart of § 16600, and other causes of action provide standing 
based on unlawful conduct. In Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP,58 for 
example, the plaintiff brought a claim of intentional interference with 
 
 50 Edwards, 189 P.3d at 290. 
 51 See id. at 290–91. 
 52 Id. at 291 (quoting Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Traffic Network, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
573, 577 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)). 
 53 See Contracts in Restraint of Trade, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600–07 (2016). 
 54 See Enforcement, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200–10 (2016). 
 55 Id. § 17204. 
 56 Id. § 17200 (emphasis added). 
 57 See Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 246 P.3d 877, 886 (Cal. 2011) (“While it is difficult to 
reduce injury-in-fact to a simple formula, economic injury is one of its paradigmatic forms.”) (quot-
ing Troyk v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 589, 623 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009)); Hall v. Time Inc., 
70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 466, 470–71 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (stating that “a plaintiff suffers an injury in 
fact . . . when he or she has . . . been denied money to which he or she has a cognizable claim,” as 
in cases regarding the payment of medical bills and the termination of disability benefits). 
 58 189 P.3d 285 (Cal. 2008). 
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prospective economic advantage59 where the underlying wrongful con-
duct alleged was a violation of § 16600. The plaintiff was required to 
sign a noncompete clause in his employment contract. In the course of 
an acquisition, the purchasing company required the employer to ter-
minate all noncompete clauses. In exchange, the employer wanted the 
plaintiff to sign a release of all claims against the employer. When the 
plaintiff refused, the employer terminated him, and the acquisition deal 
fell through.60 
The plaintiff used the apparent violation of § 16600 as the unlawful 
conduct hook for his tort claim.61 The California Supreme Court held 
that “an employer cannot by contract restrain a former employee from 
engaging in his or her profession, trade, or business unless the agree-
ment falls within one of the exceptions to the rule.”62 The court further 
rejected a court-made exception it said the Ninth Circuit had errone-
ously culled from prior California state court opinions: the exception 
would have permitted noncompete agreements “where one is barred 
from pursuing only a small or limited part of the business, trade or pro-
fession.”63 The only exceptions, the California Supreme Court ex-
plained, are those enumerated in the statute.64 It is clear that in Cali-
fornia and under § 16600 noncompete agreements have little, if any, 
room in the employment context: employee mobility is favored over em-
ployers’ interests and the freedom of contract. 
C. The Proposed Federal Mobility and Opportunity for Vulnerable 
Employees Act 
The lack of uniformity in policy and law tends to benefit employers. 
While the disparity across legal regimes means that neither employers 
nor employees will have much success predicting outcomes, states may 
race to the bottom to attract employers.65 But what’s good for an em-
 
 59 See Tortious Interference with Prospective Advantage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014) (“An intentional, damaging intrusion on another’s potential business relationship, such as 
the opportunity of obtaining customers or employment.”). 
 60 Edwards, 189 P.3d at 288–89 (reciting the facts of the case). 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 291. 
 63 Id. at 292–93 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Campbell v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford 
Jr. Univ., 817 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1987)). 
 64 Id. at 293. 
 65 See generally Timothy P. Glynn, Interjurisdictional Competition in Enforcing Noncompeti-
tion Agreements: Regulatory Risk Management and the Race to the Bottom, 65 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1381 (2008) (discussing law as a commodity and factors that make noncompetition agreement 
enforcement a potential area of state competition for businesses through favorable regulations). 
But see Bishara, Enforcement, supra note 8, at 781 (rebutting Glynn’s premise and claiming that 
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ployer may not be so good for an employee: racing to the bottom is nec-
essarily not racing to the top.66 Moreover, employers benefit from the 
law-as-commodity model because they can draft employment contracts 
to take advantage of favorable laws.67 
The rise of noncompetition agreements, especially with the use of 
overly broad restrictions against low-wage workers, has garnered at-
tention from the media,68 law enforcement,69 and Congress alike.70 De-
spite the availability of the reasonableness test for attacking overly 
broad or inappropriately applied noncompete clauses, U.S. Senators Al 
Franken (D-Minn.) and Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) proposed the Mobility 
and Opportunity for Vulnerable Employees (MOVE) Act in June 2015.71 
According to their prepared statements, both Senators were motivated 
by a concern that broad noncompetition agreements create difficulties 
for low-wage workers when they look for other employment.72 
The stated purpose of the MOVE Act is to “prohibit employers from 
requiring low-wage employees to enter into covenants not to compete, 
to require employers to notify potential employees of any requirement 
to enter into a covenant not to compete, and for other purposes.”73 That 
 
the analyzed data do not show a trend of states racing to the bottom to enact employer-friendly 
noncompete enforcement regimes). 
 66 See Glynn, supra note 65, 1383 & n.6, 1389–95, 1389 n.39 (discussing interjurisdictional 
competition models and noting the race to the bottom/race to the top debate). 
 67 See id. at 1385 (explaining that “because employers typically are the first movers in [non-
competition agreement] litigation, they often can litigate in a hospitable judicial forum”); id. at 
1421 (“From the perspective of an employer . . . , which state’s noncompetition law governs the 
enforcement of [noncompetition agreements] also matters—a lot.”). 
 68 See Greenhouse, supra note 1; Quinton, supra note 1; Jamieson, supra note 2; Omri Ben-
Shahar, California Got It Right: Ban the Non-Compete Agreements, FORBES (Oct. 27, 2016), http:// 
www.forbes.com/sites/omribenshahar/2016/10/27/california-got-it-right-ban-the-non-compete-agr 
eements/ [https://perma.cc/3E3E-Z5J5] (concluding that “to ban non-compete clauses makes much 
sense and may indeed support economic growth, technological startups, and innovation”). 
 69 Israel, supra note 4 (discussing lawsuits and investigations launched by various state at-
torneys general against employers using broad noncompete clauses). 
 70 Meredith S. Campbell, Congress May Step in to Prevent Overreaching Non-Competes, 
LEXOLOGY (June 17, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d6e7d771-7d7a-400a-
b556-aeeba0ebf09f [https://perma.cc/AUK2-DTVY]; Murphy, Franken Introduce Bill to Ban Non-
Compete Agreements for Low-Wage Workers, CHRIS MURPHY: UNITED STATES SENATOR FOR 
CONNECTICUT (June 3, 2015), https://www.murphy.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/murphy-
franken-introduce-bill-to-ban-non-compete-agreements-for-low-wage-workers [https://perma.cc/4 
NVU-2TVZ] [hereinafter Murphy Press Release]; Sen. Franken Introduces Bill to Ban Non-Com-
pete Agreements for Low-Wage Workers, AL FRANKEN: U.S. SENATOR FOR MINNESOTA (June 3, 
2015), https://www.franken.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=3167 [https://perma.cc/4W9T-PNFN] 
[hereinafter Franken Press Release]. 
 71 S.1504, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 72 See Franken Press Release, supra note 70 (“Forcing lower-wage workers to sign ‘non-com-
pete agreements’ makes it harder for these workers to find new jobs . . . .”); Murphy Press Release, 
supra note 70 (“Non-compete agreements . . . trap these workers in low-paying jobs.”); see also 
TREASURY REPORT, supra note 6. But see infra notes 143–44 and accompanying text. 
 73 S.1504, 114th Cong. (2015). 
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statement captures the effects of the operative sections, which function 
as follows. 
Foremost, the MOVE Act defines a “covenant not to compete” with 
respect to the factors of the reasonableness test.74 Under the MOVE Act, 
a covenant not to compete is any agreement “between an employee and 
employer that restricts such employee from performing . . . [1] any work 
for another employer for a specified period of time; [2] any work in a 
specified geographical area; or [3] work for another employer that is 
similar to such employee’s work for the employer included as a party to 
the agreement.”75 The Act does not mention the reasonableness stand-
ard, and the language is written broadly by using “any” and the disjunc-
tive “or.” Importantly, the MOVE Act would not implement a federal 
reasonableness test, but would statutorily prohibit the use of any kind 
of restrictive covenant between employers and their low-wage employ-
ees. 
A low-wage employee under the MOVE Act is one who earns less 
than $15 per hour or $31,200 per year.76 An exclusion is made, though, 
for salaried employees who receive “compensation that, for 2 consecu-
tive months, is greater than . . . $5,000.”77 
Sections 3 and 4 contain the heart of the MOVE Act. Section 3 pro-
hibits employers from “enter[ing] into a covenant not to compete with 
any low-wage employee” and requires notice of the Act to be posted in a 
“conspicuous place on the premises of [the] employer.”78 Section 4, on 
the other hand, creates a disclosure requirement when dealing with 
non-low-wage earners. If an employer wishes to enter into a covenant 
not to compete with an employee that earns more than $15 per hour, 
earns more than $31,200 per year, or receives the exclusion compensa-
tion,79 the employer “shall, prior to the employment of such employee 
and at the beginning of the process for hiring such employee, have dis-
closed to such employee the requirement for entering into such cove-
nant.”80 
 
 74 See S.1504 § 2(2). 
 75 Id. (emphasis added). 
 76 See id. §§ 2(4)–(5). 
 77 Id. § 2(5). It is not clear whether the exclusion is triggered by two consecutive months of 
compensation totaling at least $5,000 or by compensation of at least $5,000 for each of two consec-
utive months. 
 78 Id. § 3. 
 79 This Comment will focus on the $15 per hour provision to simplify the discussion, but it 
should be noted that the annual pay and exclusion compensation provisions operate similarly. 
 80 S.1504 § 4 (The MOVE Act does not provide a definition or any guideline for what is the 
“beginning of the process for hiring” an employee.). 
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Finally, section 5 provides for enforcement of the MOVE Act. Gen-
erally, the Secretary of Labor is responsible for enforcing the provisions 
of the Act. More precisely, though, the Secretary is to “receive, investi-
gate, attempt to resolve, and enforce a complaint . . . in the same man-
ner that the Secretary” does for “a violation of section 6 or 7 of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act of 1938.”81 This means that, for the purposes of 
enforcement, the Secretary of Labor should treat the MOVE Act like the 
minimum wage and maximum workweek laws.82 The Act also defines 
the maximum civil penalties as $5,000 for a violation of the workplace 
notice requirement and $5,000 per employee for entering into a prohib-
ited covenant not to compete—either with a low-wage employee or with 
a non-low-wage employee who has not been provided the required dis-
closure.83 
II. PREEMPTION ANALYSIS OF CALIFORNIA STATE LAW AND THE 
MOVE ACT 
A. The Preemption of State Laws by Federal Statutes 
Whenever Congress passes legislation covering an area of law that 
is also within the domain of states, by common law or by state legisla-
tion, there is the question of which law controls. Does the federal law 
preempt the state law? Or does the federal law give way to the state 
law? Or must there be some other interaction between the two? Answer-
ing these questions can be difficult, but doing so is a constitutional im-
perative. The Supremacy Clause states that: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall 
be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State 
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of 
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.84 
 
 81 Id. § 5(a). 
 82 See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012) (setting forth the minimum wage requirements under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA)); id. § 207 (setting for the maximum workweek requirements under 
the FLSA); id. § 204 (creating obligations for and powers of the Secretary of Labor and an Admin-
istrator of the Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division); id. § 211 (granting authority to the 
§ 204 Administrator to “investigate and gather data” as needed); id. § 215(2) (prohibiting violations 
of §§ 206 and 207); id. § 216 (defining the penalties and remedies for violations of the FLSA); id. 
§ 218 (defining the relation of the FLSA provisions to other laws). 
 83 S.1504 § 5(b). 
 84 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
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There is no doubt that Congress has the power to preempt state 
law. But, like any constitutional authority, having a power and exercis-
ing that power are different things. Moreover, federalist concerns about 
the balance of powers were not only instrumental in the construction of 
the Constitution,85 but motivate against the presumption that Congress 
exercises its authority to preempt state law in every statute it enacts.86 
Although there are many disagreements about the operation of the 
preemption doctrine,87 the Court has reaffirmed its position that the 
analysis begins with a presumption against preemption.88 
Moving past the presumption against preemption, state laws can 
be preempted expressly or impliedly. The existence of a statutory clause 
expressly addressing preemption, though, does not fully resolve the is-
sue.89 Therefore, courts must frequently apply the doctrines of implied 
preemption even where Congress has spoken.90 There are three modes 
of implied preemption: conflict preemption, obstacle preemption, and 
field preemption. Federal and state laws conflict when the laws diverge 
so much that it is “impossible for a private party to comply with both 
 
 85 See id. (The Supremacy Clause); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (The Full Faith and Credit Clause); 
U.S. CONST. amend. X (Reserved Powers to States). See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 313 (James 
Madison) (Cooke ed., 1961) (stating that “[t]he powers delegated by the proposed constitution to 
the federal government, are few and defined,” yet “[t]hose which are to remain in the state govern-
ments are numerous and indefinite”). 
 86 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (plurality opinion) (stating that “be-
cause the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that 
Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action”); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (stating that when “Congress [has] legislated . . . in [a] field which the 
States have traditionally occupied . . . we start with the assumption that the historic police powers 
of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest 
purpose of Congress”). See also Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 
2085, 2085–86 (2000) (explaining that in spite of some inconsistencies, “[i]t is generally accepted, 
however, that these cases found in traditional federalism principles a presumption against federal 
preemption of state law”). 
 87 See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 583 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment 
only) (stating that finding implied preemption based on “purposes and objectives” that “are not 
embodied within the text of federal law” is “inconsistent with the Constitution”); Cipollone v. Lig-
gett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 545–48 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the presumption 
against preemption should not apply when an express provision is enacted and that an express 
provision does not necessarily render implied preemption inapplicable). 
 88 See Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008) (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230). 
 89 See, for example, Altria, 555 U.S. 70, and Cipollone, 505 U.S. 504, in which the Court ad-
dressed whether “requirements and prohibitions” that were expressly preempted by the Cigarette 
Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–41, included state common law duties such as 
the duty to warn. Altria affirmed the Cipollone plurality that the common law duties were not 
preempted, and, thus, plaintiffs had causes of action thereunder. 
 90 See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 545–48 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that conflict and obstacle 
preemption still have room to operate despite the presence of an express provision). 
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state and federal requirements,”91 as well as when compliance is tech-
nically possible but the laws “give contradictory commands.”92 A state 
law is preempted under obstacle preemption when it “stands as an ob-
stacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and ob-
jectives of Congress.”93 And Congress’s purpose is the controlling factor, 
though the purpose of the state law may be informative.94 Finally, field 
preemption occurs when state law “regulates conduct in a field that 
Congress intended the Federal Government to occupy exclusively.”95 
Before turning to the main arguments of this Comment, several 
tests can be more immediately addressed. First, because contract law 
and employment law are two areas traditionally left to the states,96 the 
presumption against preemption disfavors preempting § 16600. The 
presumption, though, rarely ends the inquiry.97 The MOVE Act is silent 
on preemption, so there is no need to consider express preemption. Sim-
ilarly, one test of conflict preemption is straightforward: an employer 
can technically comply with both the MOVE Act and § 16600 by simply 
never using noncompete clauses. Finally, the MOVE Act does not 
clearly leave “no room for the States to supplement” federal law:98 for 
example, states could impose more disclosure requirements or set a 
higher wage. Field preemption is thus not implicated. 
 
 91 Mut. Pharm. Co., Inc. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2468–69, 2473 (2013) (quoting English v. 
Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990)) (holding that it would be impossible to comply with an FDA 
law prohibiting changes to labels after drug approval and a state law that required changes in 
certain circumstances). But see, Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 573 (holding the opposite). 
 92 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 590 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment only) (noting that if a federal 
law grants a right that state law prohibits, abstaining from conduct might lead to compliance, but 
the laws nonetheless “give directly conflicting commands”). 
 93 English, 496 U.S. at 79 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
 94 See Note, Preemption as Purposivism’s Last Refuge, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1065–68 (2013) 
[hereinafter Preemption: Purposivism] (discussing obstacle preemption and field preemption with 
emphasis on federal legislative intent). See, e.g., Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987) 
(discussing Congress’s purpose for the Clean Water Act, but only mentioning state laws with re-
gards to where they fit within the federal regulatory framework and never examining the Vermont 
state law at issue for its independent purpose). 
 95 English, 496 U.S. at 79. 
 96 Although Congress has passed many employment laws, numerous employment matters re-
main with the states—for example, trade secret protection, unfair competition, and even state-
based minimum wages. See, e.g., Dilts v. Penske Logistics, LLC, 769 F.3d 637, 643 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(stating that “[w]age and hour laws constitute areas of traditional state regulation”) (citing Cal. 
Div. of Labor Standards Enf’t v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., 519 U.S. 316, 330–34 (1997)). 
 97 See Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 740 
(2008) (discussing the inconsistency of the so-called fundamental principles of preemption doc-
trine); see also S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U.L. 
REV. 685, 733 (1991) (“The Supreme Court’s devotion to its presumptions, however, can only be 
described as fickle.”). 
 98 English, 496 U.S. at 79 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); 
see also, S.1504 § 2(4) (defining the “livable hourly rate,” which is the basis for a low-wage worker, 
the Act leaves room for states to provide a higher wage than $15 per hour). 
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B. Invalidation under § 16600 Would Conflict with Federal Policy 
Although the MOVE Act is only a proposed bill at present, there 
are nonetheless helpful indicators of congressional purpose. This Com-
ment, of course, assumes that Congress would pass the MOVE Act as it 
is currently written and therefore draws upon the information available 
thus far in the process. This is undoubtedly less information than might 
be available if the statute were fully debated and enacted, but the fol-
lowing sections demonstrate that it is enough to form a sound conclu-
sion. 
Although a stated purpose may be elucidating, the stated purpose 
of the MOVE Act does nothing more than summarize the operative sec-
tions.99 No members of Congress made any further statements during 
the session in which Senator Murphy introduced the bill,100 nor has the 
bill been debated or otherwise recorded. But the lack of extratextual 
information is a boon for this inquiry given the Supreme Court’s pref-
erence for textual analysis in non-preemption cases.101 If an argument 
that resembles traditional preemption doctrine can be made on scarce 
sources other than the statute, then the argument is all the stronger. 
And obstacle preemption is losing favor with the Court because of the 
test’s focus on congressional purposes.102 Textual arguments can re-
cover some of that lost ground.103 
1. The MOVE Act balances employer and employee interests 
The MOVE Act essentially creates an enhanced minimum wage for 
workers required to enter into noncompetition agreements: they must 
be paid at least $15 per hour.104 This is clearly a line-drawing effort. 
But why? Congress could enact a statute that prohibits all noncompeti-
tion agreements in the employment context regardless of wages.105 Em-
ployers, though, face more costs than the wages they pay workers. For 
 
 99 See id. §§ 3(a), 4. 
 100 161 CONG. REC. S3776 (daily ed. June 4, 2015) (statement of Sen. Murphy). 
 101 See generally Preemption: Purposivism, supra note 94 (describing how the Court abandons 
textual analysis when approaching questions of preemption and arguing that departure from tex-
tualism is unnecessary). 
 102 See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 583 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment only) 
(writing separately to criticize the Court’s “‘purposes and objectives’ pre-emption jurisprudence”). 
 103 See id. (stating that “implied pre-emption doctrines that wander far from the statutory text 
are inconsistent with the Constitution”). 
 104 S.1504 § 3(a); see also supra Part I, Section C, for a brief explanation that the annual pay 
and exclusion compensation provisions operate the same as the hourly wage requirement. 
 105 The language and structure of S.1504 cannot be considered an accident. Congress is un-
doubtedly aware of the variety of state legislation on covenants not to compete—from California’s 
statutory ban in CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 to Texas’s regard for the freedom of contract 
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example, employers may share proprietary information with employees 
and thus risk losing their hold on that information when employees 
leave. Employers also make considerable investments in training work-
ers for their jobs. 
The wage distinction establishes a tradeoff between, on the one 
hand, protecting employee mobility and, on the other hand, respecting 
the freedom of contract and permitting employers to protect their inter-
ests. In other words, where an employee is informed and properly com-
pensated, federal policy under the MOVE Act would be to leave intact 
the mutual rights of the employer and employee to contract with each 
other. Federal law should only protect an employee’s mobility and cur-
tail the employer’s rights when the employee earns below the enhanced 
minimum wage. 
Reading the notice and disclosure provisions further supports the 
Act’s achievement of balancing employee and employer interests. The 
purpose of these provisions is obviously to inform employees and poten-
tial employees of their respective rights. Any employee subject to a cov-
enant not to compete will know she is entitled to at least $15 per hour, 
and any potential employee will have legally mandated notice of an 
agreement that would restrain her mobility. It is important, though, to 
read § 4 in light of § 3(a). Since the Act prohibits covenants not to com-
pete in employment contracts with low-wage workers, the mandated 
disclosure only applies to workers earning at least $15 per hour. The 
wage distinction is visible again: above the wage threshold, federal pol-
icy would be to inform the applicant of a restraint, but ultimately to 
respect her and the employer’s freedom of contract. 
This balancing of interests is not surprising given the myriad of 
state laws in which the reasonableness test, and thus the freedom of 
contract, is predominant. Congress is presumed to be “knowledgeable 
about existing law pertinent to the legislation it enacts,”106 and the in-
clusion of the factors of the reasonableness test in the MOVE Act sup-
port application of that presumption here.107 Moreover, common sense 
stands as a barrier to the notion that “Congress has omitted from its 
 
under TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 15.50(a). 
 106 Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 184–85 (1988) (stating that “[i]n the absence 
of affirmative evidence in the language or history of the statute, we are unwilling to assume that 
Congress was ignorant of [relevant state law]”); see also Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 
696–97 (1979) (“It is always appropriate to assume that our elected representatives, like other 
citizens, know the law.”). 
 107 See, e.g., Goodyear Atomic Corp., 486 U.S. at 185 (noting that Congress was apparently 
aware of the state workers’ compensation schemes because it designated that the federal plan 
should operate “‘in the same way and to the same extent’ as provided by state law”). 
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adopted text requirements that it nonetheless intends to apply.”108 Sen-
ators Franken and Murphy could have proposed stronger legislation 
against the freedom of contract, like § 16600. Instead, the Act would 
establish a compensation requirement as the point where federal law 
pivots away from existing state laws. So long as an employer ensures 
that an employee is informed and paid the enhanced minimum wage, 
her mobility may be restrained. And she may be paid less, so long as 
the employer does not restrain her mobility. 
2. Section 16600 would disrupt the balancing of interests 
California “courts have consistently affirmed that § 16600 evinces 
a settled legislative policy in favor of open competition and employee 
mobility.”109 At first, this policy seems compatible with the MOVE Act 
because both statutes seek to limit restraints on an employee’s freedom 
to work in her occupation of choice. The core distinction between the 
two statutes, though, is the scope of the prohibition: “the state Act’s 
generality stands at odds with the federal discreteness.”110 While 
§ 16600 makes all covenants not to compete unlawful, save for a few 
exceptions,111 the MOVE Act would only prohibit covenants not to com-
pete in the employment context and as applied to low-wage workers.112 
The difference in scope is such that § 16600 would fail both obstacle and 
conflict preemption. 
First, operation of California law would frustrate the purposes and 
objectives of a Congress that enacts the MOVE Act by intruding on the 
balancing of interests the Act would achieve. Most states have long rec-
ognized the freedom of contract and permitted employers to protect le-
gitimate interests—like proprietary information and employee train-
ing—through reasonable covenants not to compete.113 Aware of these 
laws and employer interests, but motivated to cure a perceived problem 
of mobility, the proponents of the MOVE Act propose a tradeoff. Below 
 
 108 Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enf’t, 543 U.S. 335, 341 (2005) (rejecting a requirement 
that removal of an alien to a country pursuant to 8 U.S.C § 1231(b)(2)(E)(i)–(vi) required that 
country to “accept” the alien when none of those subsections had an acceptance requirement, but 
the alternative clause in subsection (E)(vii) did). 
 109 Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 291 (Cal. 2008). 
 110 Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 379 (2000) (holding that Massachu-
setts trade regulations were preempted despite an arguably compatible goal because the state law 
implemented different and broader sanctions and prohibitions). 
 111 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600–07. See also Edwards, 189 P.3d at 293 (holding that the 
only exceptions to § 16600 are those listed in the statute). 
 112 S.1504, §§ 3–4. 
 113 See supra Part I, Section A (Excluding states with broad statutory prohibitions like Califor-
nia and North Dakota, states in each of Selmi’s groups and across Bishara’s index still use the 
reasonableness test to gauge an employer’s effort to protect a legitimate interest.). 
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the wage threshold of $15 per hour, employee mobility is protected. 
Above that wage, freedom of contract remains prevalent and permits 
employers to protect their interests. But the broad legislative prohibi-
tion of § 16600 and the California Supreme Court’s rejection of judge-
made exceptions114 work together so that no employer could seek to pro-
tect any interest with a noncompete clause, and no employee could seek 
a higher wage in exchange for entering into a noncompetition agree-
ment.115 Section 16600 thus stands as an obstacle to the MOVE Act and 
would be preempted. 
Furthermore, commentators have noted that as the Supreme Court 
has considered narrowing obstacle preemption, it has shown a similar 
preference for expanding conflict preemption through the direct conflict 
test.116 This is not unexpected given the framing of the two tests—a con-
tradictory command certainly frustrates the purposes and objectives of 
Congress. Consider the commands of § 16600 and the MOVE Act. Cali-
fornia says, “do not make this contract.” The MOVE Act says, “you can 
make it, but you have to pay for it.” Although not polar opposites, this 
contrast fits well into Justice Thomas’s description of the direct conflict 
test: “if federal law gives an individual the right to engage in certain 
behavior that state law prohibits, the laws would give contradictory 
commands.”117 Here, the federal law gives employers a right—indeed, a 
precise formula for permission—to bind their employees by covenants 
not to compete: give them notice and pay them at least $15 per hour.118 
There is no question that California law would prohibit that arrange-
ment and void the agreement.119 California’s command is therefore in 
direct conflict with the rights contemplated by the MOVE Act: § 16600 
would thus be preempted. 
 
 114 See Edwards, 189 P.3d at 293 (holding that § 16600 is the domain of the legislature). 
 115 It is worth noting that such an exchange could also result in greater employer investment 
in training and general job stability, which might also impact other benefits like the availability 
of stock options and employer contributions to retirement plans. 
 116 See Gregory M. Dickinson, An Empirical Study of Obstacle Preemption in the Supreme 
Court, 89 NEB. L. REV. 682, 683 (2011) (explaining that “[s]uch an expansion is likely made neces-
sary by the gap” left by narrowing obstacle preemption); Lauren Gilbert, Immigrant Laws, Obsta-
cle Preemption and the Lost Legacy of McCulloch, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 162–63 
(2012) (noting that as obstacle preemption is disfavored, “the Court may feel the need to expand 
the scope of impossibility preemption beyond . . . ‘physical impossibility’”). 
 117 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 590 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment only). 
 118 See S.1504 §§ 3(a), 4. 
 119 See, e.g., Edwards, 189 P.3d at 292 (“The noncompetition agreement that Edwards was re-
quired to sign before commencing employment with Andersen was therefore invalid because it 
restrained his ability to practice his profession.”). 
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C. Nullification in California Would Preclude Federal Remedies 
It is also important to consider the means by which the MOVE Act 
would operate.120 This is crucial because, again, federal law can 
preempt state law despite a compatible purpose when the state law nev-
ertheless obstructs the operation of the federal law.121 Therefore, under-
standing how the MOVE Act would affect the employer-employee rela-
tionship through rights of action and remedies is important to assess 
how § 16600 could interfere with the objectives of the Act. 
1. The MOVE Act provides for a private cause of action 
The stated remedies of the MOVE Act are found in § 5, which de-
scribes enforcement and heavily incorporates the FLSA. One method by 
which the MOVE Act is intended to operate is by deterring employers 
from engaging in wrongful conduct: an employer in violation of the 
MOVE Act risks thousands of dollars per violation,122 and perhaps even 
imprisonment.123 
The MOVE Act could also achieve its objectives through employer 
liability to the employee. The proposed statute, however, makes no di-
rect mention of a private right of action or an employee’s entitlement to 
damages. But these remedies are provided for in the FLSA for violations 
of the minimum wage and maximum hour provisions.124 Although en-
forcement of MOVE Act violations could be entirely left up to the Sec-
retary of Labor—if the § 5(b) civil fine provision were the only operative 
remedy—it is reasonable to conclude that there is a private right of ac-
tion from the directive for enforcement in the “same manner” as under 
the FLSA sections,125 as well as the MOVE Act’s requirement that its 
 
 120 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 486 (1996) (stating that “[a]lso relevant” to un-
derstanding Congress’s intent “is the ‘structure and purpose of the statute as a whole’ . . . as re-
vealed not only in the text, but through the reviewing court’s reasoned understanding of the way 
in which Congress intended the statute and its surrounding regulatory scheme to” work); Wis. 
Dept. of Indus., Labor and Human Res. v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 286 (1986) (recognizing that 
“[c]onflict in technique can be fully as disruptive . . . as conflict in overt policy”). 
 121 See Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 493 (1987) (explaining that “the Court must 
be guided by the goals and policies of the [federal] Act” in order to avoid a “result [that] would be 
a serious interference with the achievement of the ‘full purposes and objectives of Congress’”). 
 122 S.1504 § 5(b) (setting the maximum fine to $5000 for each violation). 
 123 The FLSA section apparently supplanted by S.1504 § 5(b) refers to imprisonment as well. 
See 29 U.S.C. § 216(a) (providing for a fine of up to $10,000, imprisonment for up to six months, or 
both). It is equally possible that S.1504 § 5(b) eliminates imprisonment as a penalty or that it only 
redefines the maximum civil fine. 
 124 See id. § 216(b) (providing for employer liability to the employee for unpaid compensation, 
as well as “an additional equal amount as liquidated damages”). 
 125 S.1504 § 5(a). 
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provisions be posted in the workplace.126 Naturally, an employee who 
sees the posted notice and is aware that she is both bound by a covenant 
not to compete and inadequately paid will want to seek recovery. Given 
the FLSA’s private right of action, there is no textual support for elim-
inating that right under the MOVE Act in light of its broad inclusion of 
FLSA enforcement provisions. 
And because the MOVE Act draws a line around prohibited conduct 
at a specific wage level, there are two remedies it may provide if a pri-
vate right of action is available: either (1) the contract is void, at least 
to the extent of the covenant not to compete; or (2) the employee is due 
unpaid compensation for being required to enter into the agreement.127 
The language of the Act does not point to either remedy. Thus, a court 
could allow a plaintiff to choose her remedy when filing a complaint. 
The text arguably supports this result. First, the MOVE Act incorpo-
rates enforcement provisions from the FLSA, which does provide dam-
ages for unpaid compensation in both minimum wage and overtime vi-
olations.128 Furthermore, the MOVE Act does not have an ex ante 
preference for the employee’s position on either side of the wage line: 
§ 4 says Congress would be okay with restrictive covenants if an em-
ployee is informed and properly compensated, and § 3 says Congress 
would be okay with a lower wage as long as the employee’s mobility is 
not restrained. When an employee falls in the prohibited gap—bound 
by an agreement but underpaid—the law should leave the preference 
to her: either (1) lower compensation, but void the contract, or (2) keep 
the restraint on mobility, but recover unpaid wages.129 Therefore, as 
with a private right of action in general, the incorporation of FLSA pro-
visions and the language of the MOVE Act support a reading that cre-
ates employer liability for unpaid wages. 
2. Section 16600 would impede a right to unpaid wages 
Ultimately, § 16600 would eviscerate the enhanced minimum wage 
established by the MOVE Act and thereby eliminate the private right 
of action. While the MOVE Act prohibits employers from “enter[ing] 
 
 126 Id. § 3(b). 
 127 If it provided both a voided contract and monetary relief, the plaintiff would get a windfall, 
being in a better position than an employee whose employer complied with the law. There is no 
reason to think the statute is intended to do this. 
 128 See 29 U.S.C. § 216 (providing that an “employer who violates the provisions of section 206 
or section 207 of this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of 
their unpaid . . . compensation”). 
 129 It is not clear whether a non-low-wage worker would have standing or what remedy she 
could sue for: she would have received a legal wage, and the suit demonstrates knowledge. It may 
be that violations of § 4 (requiring disclosure) are enforceable only by the Secretary. 
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into a covenant not to compete with any low-wage employee,”130 the Act 
does not invalidate the agreement. In California, however, any employ-
ment contract that contains a noncompete clause is “to that extent void” 
under § 16600 and, thus, not enforceable from the instant it takes form. 
A court must rule accordingly and cannot simultaneously award dam-
ages in the form of unpaid wages pursuant to the MOVE Act.131 Legally, 
the employer and employee did not form a valid noncompetition agree-
ment. Without the agreement, the MOVE Act’s provisions would be in-
operative, and a low-wage employee would have no grounds for de-
manding enhanced wages because her mobility would not have been 
restrained. 
Notice that the counterfactual is a classic moral hazard. If a plain-
tiff could obtain both remedies, she would have an incentive to seek out 
illegal contracts under California law. If she happens to also earn illegal 
wages under the MOVE Act, then she can get a windfall: mobility and 
enhanced wages. But the employees of compliant California employers 
only get mobility. This disparity might not be a concern if we think the 
employer intended to unduly restrain the plaintiff’s future employment 
activities. After all, the windfall to the low-wage plaintiff is really a 
penalty on the employer who pays for it.132 
But § 16600 does not place a burden on the employer when it states 
that “every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a 
lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent 
void.”133 A knowing employee who willfully and intentionally makes an 
illegal contract with her employer has also committed a wrong under 
§ 16600 and should not be rewarded. The MOVE Act, though, does not 
have an ex ante preference for the employee’s mobility—she may inten-
tionally enter into the noncompetition agreement in order to obtain 
higher wages. In fact, § 4 requires the employer in that case to disclose 
the agreement prior to starting the hiring process. An express purpose 
of the MOVE Act is to inform an employee of the noncompete clause and 
the wage requirements so that she knowledgeably and willfully agrees 
to the restraint. 
 
 130 S.1504 § 3. 
 131 But see CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200, 17204 (A plaintiff that can show economic injury 
as a result of having entered into the invalid agreement may be entitled to recovery.). But the 
MOVE Act’s enhanced wage logically cannot serve as the alleged economic injury. 
 132 See supra Part I, Section C. California law may provide for recovery under laws like CAL. 
BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200, 17204 and the tort of intentional interference with prospective eco-
nomic advantage. But these laws would not protect a plaintiff that willfully induced the conduct. 
 133 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600. 
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Moreover, if the MOVE Act preempts § 16600 in a low-wage action, 
it must preempt § 16600 in a non-low-wage action, as well.134 Other-
wise, employers would face a moral hazard. If all noncompetition agree-
ments with non-low-wage workers are voided by § 16600, but agree-
ments with low-wage workers will be enforceable if they sue for unpaid 
wages, then employers will be incentivized to pay their workers less 
than $15 per hour to obtain enforceable agreements. In other words, 
employers will violate the express provisions of the MOVE Act in order 
to obtain enforceability under the MOVE Act in low-wage actions and 
avoid lawsuits that could result in invalidation under § 16600. Preemp-
tion in low-wage actions thus necessitates preemption in all actions. 
Even if policies seem compatible at first, divergent means of achiev-
ing a similar goal can be “disruptive to the system Congress erected.”135 
Section 16600 frustrates the purposes and objectives of the MOVE Act 
by invalidating the antecedent contract that must be formed in order to 
establish the Act’s enhanced minimum wage. To preserve a remedy for 
unpaid wages, the MOVE Act must preempt § 16600 in low-wage ac-
tions. The laws cannot coexist because that would incentivize low-wage 
employees to seek illegal contracts and employers to pay illegal wages. 
The MOVE Act and § 16600 would therefore be in direct conflict. The 
Supremacy Clause would require preemption. 
D. Section 16600 Would Not Fill Gaps in the MOVE Act 
An alternative framing of the interaction between the MOVE Act 
and § 16600 begins by considering the target population: vulnerable 
employees. On the one hand, the MOVE Act defines these employees as 
those that earn less than $15 per hour. On the other hand, § 16600 
draws no line and, thus, protects all employees from restrictive cove-
nants regardless of their wages. Logically, the California prohibition 
has a scope broader than and inclusive of the population targeted by the 
MOVE Act. It still protects low-wage workers from being required to 
enter into covenants not to compete. 
Compare this interaction to minimum wage laws. Under federal 
law, employers must pay employees at least a minimum hourly rate of 
$7.25 per hour.136 Presently, California’s minimum wage is $10 per 
hour.137 Federal law does not preempt California’s law even though it 
essentially renders the federal law inoperative. Similarly, even though 
 
 134 A non-low-wage worker may not have standing. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
Regardless, the following argument applies no matter who sues the employer. 
 135 Wis. Dept. of Indus., Labor and Human Res. v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 286 (1986). 
 136 29 U.S.C. § 206. 
 137 CAL. LAB. CODE § 1182.12 (2016). 
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the MOVE Act would essentially be ineffective in California, that is ac-
ceptable because the California law protects the same, and more, work-
ers. 
There is some weight to this argument, and it is especially alluring 
given the simplified and straightforward definition of the objectives of 
each law. The problem, however, is that even if the purposes are as-
sumed to be compatible, it is still important to consider how the two 
interact given the mandate of the Supremacy Clause.138 Again, the min-
imum wage laws present a good example, and it helps to consider the 
gap-filling relationship between the laws. Even though California’s 
higher wage requirement effectively renders the federal law moot, it is 
really filling a gap between two policy judgments. Federal law provides 
$7.25 per hour to every employee. The California legislature decided 
that employees should always earn more. The compensation that Cali-
fornia requires above the federal minimum wage is filling a gap—to the 
tune of $2.75 per hour. There are two important parts to this gap-filling 
state law: (1) the gap is filled, so to speak, on a per person basis; and (2) 
the nature of the right addressed is one-dimensional: paying an em-
ployee $10 per hour necessarily pays her $7.25 per hour. 
Compare this to the MOVE Act and § 16600. First, the gap is filled 
in terms of the population protected and not with respect to per-person 
policy considerations. Section 16600 expands the group of protected em-
ployees from low-wage workers to all workers. In this context, no par-
ticular worker benefits more because of the gap being filled. If no single 
person is worse off because of the state law, then this kind of gap filling 
would probably be permissible. But the interaction among the individ-
ual rights addressed by the MOVE Act and § 16600 do not occur along 
a single dimension. Instead, a person’s rights in this context are more 
like a hand of trading cards. Section 16600 gives employees a mobility 
card, but it leaves employers empty-handed. The MOVE Act gives em-
ployers and employees complimentary sets of cards covering employee 
mobility, minimum wages, and employment disclosures. Resting on the 
freedom of contract, the Act permits employers and employees to nego-
tiate, trading their cards according to their interests. There are, how-
ever, no exchanges available under § 16600 because the employer has 
no cards to trade. The Supremacy Clause requires courts give federal 
law priority over state law.139 If § 16600 added cards to either side or 
 
 138 See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 252 (2000) (explaining that the Suprem-
acy Clause “requires courts to disregard [a] state rule” that would prevent the application of a 
“valid rule[ ] of federal law”). 
 139 See William Hochul III, Enforcement in Kind: Reexamining the Preemption Doctrine in Ar-
izona v. United States, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2225, 2227 (2012) (citing Nelson, supra note 138, 
at 250) (explaining that “the Supremacy Clause establishes a rule of federal priority when a court 
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both sides, then perhaps the interaction could be characterized as har-
monious. But California law would remove several federal cards from 
play. 
While state law can fill gaps in federal law, the Supremacy Clause 
does not allow state law to make federal law ineffectual.140 This stems, 
of course, from the need to respect the congressional prerogative to leg-
islate uniformly across the nation.141 The case law and other materials 
reviewed in Part I of this Comment help paint a picture of the back-
ground against which Congress would exercise that prerogative if the 
MOVE Act were enacted. It is apparent that the proponents of the 
MOVE Act have chosen to legislate in a particular position—in the spot 
between knowing employers are using noncompetition agreements with 
low-wage workers142 and worrying that the effects are adverse, but not 
having enough empirical evidence to draw a conclusion.143 Evidence 
shows that employers use noncompetition agreements regardless of the 
enforcement regime in a state,144 and the MOVE Act is an attempt spe-
cifically to reach employer conduct at the federal level.145 Section 16600, 
though, would make the MOVE Act inoperative in California even if the 
policies appear compatible. The Supremacy Clause forbids that. 
 
must choose between applying state or federal laws”). 
 140 See Nelson, supra note 138, at 250–53 (describing the rule of priority set out by the Suprem-
acy Clause and that “any obligation to disregard state law” derives from the first-order “obligation 
to follow federal law”). 
 141 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (granting to Congress the power “[t]o make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper”); id. art. VI, cl. 2 (declaring that federal law is “the supreme Law 
of the Land[ ] and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby”); Nelson, supra note 138, at 
246 (explaining that one objective of the Supremacy Clause is to “make[ ] clear that . . . federal 
statutes take effect automatically within each state” and apply “even in state courts”). 
 142 See Greenhouse, supra note 1 (discussing the proliferation of noncompete clauses in a num-
ber of different sectors); Jamieson, supra note 2 (discussing Jimmy John’s broad use of noncompete 
clauses with every level of employee). 
 143 See generally Mark J. Garmaise, Ties That Truly Bind: Non-competition Agreements, Exec-
utive Compensation, and Firm Investment, 27 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 376 (2011) (finding impacts from 
noncompetition agreements on compensation, mobility, and training for executive employees). 
Garmaise’s results may not apply to low-wage employees, and, to date, no comparable studies have 
been found with a focus on low-wage employees. See also TREASURY REPORT, supra note 6, at 21 
(showing that enforceability of noncompetition agreements may affect employees’ ability to earn 
higher wages later in their career). The report, however, does not normalize wages: for instance, 
both California and New York do not favor noncompete clauses, see Bishara, Enforcement, supra 
note 8, 786–87 fig.1, and have high populations of wealth that may skew wage comparisons. 
 144 See James J. Prescott, et al., Understanding Noncompetition Agreements: The 2014 Non-
compete Survey Project, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 369, 455–63 (2016) (concluding that “the frequency 
of noncompetes in a state appears unrelated to the governing legal regime”). 
 145 See S.1504 preamble, § 3(a) (stating that its purpose is “[t]o prohibit employers from requir-
ing low-wage employees to enter into covenants not to compete,” and requiring that “[n]o employer 
shall enter into a covenant not to compete with any low-wage employee”) (emphasis added). 
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E. The FLSA Savings Clause Would Not Save § 16600 
It might also be argued that because the MOVE Act extensively 
incorporates definitions and enforcement provisions from the FLSA, the 
FLSA’s savings clause146 would apply as well. Nothing in the definitions 
would require incorporating the FLSA savings clause, though, and it is 
at least not obvious that enforcement “in the same manner” as FLSA 
violations requires incorporation of the savings clause either.147 
The enforcement provision of the MOVE Act defines how the “Sec-
retary shall receive, investigate, attempt to resolve, and enforce a com-
plaint of a violation” of the MOVE Act.148 This involves the procedure 
by which the Secretary would carry out her duties in response to a com-
plaint of violation. For instance, under the FLSA, the Secretary “may 
investigate and gather data . . . to determine whether any person has 
violated any provision of this chapter, or which may aid in the enforce-
ment of the provisions of this chapter.”149 The MOVE Act surely incor-
porates this section. Moreover, the penalties provided for under the 
FLSA are likely also incorporated, including civil penalties, potential 
imprisonment, and a private right of action to recover damages, subject 
to the MOVE Act’s adjusted maximum civil fines.150 
Whether the enforcement provision’s language would be read to 
further incorporate the FLSA savings clause is unclear. But even if the 
clause were included, it would not help § 16600 escape preemption. Con-
gress wrote the FLSA savings clause narrowly to address the “minimum 
wage established under this chapter,” the “maximum workweek estab-
lished under this chapter,” and “provision[s] of this chapter relating to 
the employment of child labor.”151 The preserved laws are limited to 
those establishing higher minimum wages, lower maximum work-
weeks, and higher child labor standards.152 Incorporating that clause 
into the MOVE Act would, therefore, only save a state law if it estab-
lished a wage greater than $15 per hour as the threshold at which an 
employer could escape liability under the MOVE Act.153 Neither the lan- 
 
 
 146 Relation to other laws, 29 U.S.C. § 218. 
 147 See S.1504, § 5(a). 
 148 Id. 
 149 29 U.S.C. § 211. 
 150 S.1504, § 5(b). 
 151 29 U.S.C. § 218(a). 
 152 See id. 
 153 See S.1504 § 2(4) (defining the “livable hourly rate” as the greater of $15 per hour or the 
“minimum wage required by the applicable” state law, suggesting that an applicable state law 
could be one that also targets covenants not to compete but provides a higher wage). 
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guage of the MOVE Act, nor the language of the FLSA savings clause, 
support exempting the broad invalidation of agreements provided for 
by § 16600 from preemption. 
CONCLUSION 
If the MOVE Act or similar legislation were passed, it would 
preempt California’s broad statutory ban on noncompetition agree-
ments. This result is complicated by a call to action from the Obama 
Administration in 2016 that asked state legislatures to update their 
policies in order to curb the use of noncompete agreements in employ-
ment contracts. Proposed federal bills and the call to action represent 
mixed signals to state legislatures. This Comment further illustrates 
some of the difficulty in determining which level of government should 
respond and which government’s law will prevail in real controversies. 
The laws and policies of employment and of contracts have tradi-
tionally been the domain of the states. That, however, has resulted in a 
medley of enforcement regimes, including the common law reasonable-
ness test employed with varying vigor, statutory implementations of 
that test, and some statutory prohibitions of restrictive covenants. 
Although the MOVE Act and § 16600 embody ostensibly compatible 
policies, the laws operate in distinct ways. In particular, § 16600 is a 
nearly absolute prohibition on covenants not to compete that leaves 
very little room for mobility restraints in employment contracts. Yet the 
MOVE Act defines a bright-line rule that achieves a balancing of inter-
ests. On one side of the line, the Act would prohibit the use of noncom-
petition agreements with low-wage workers, but on the other side of the 
line, the Act expressly contemplates the use of noncompete clauses in 
contracts with informed and properly compensated employees. The re-
sult is that California’s broad prohibition would obstruct the operation 
of the MOVE Act. The conflict is clear not only in theoretical rights as 
between the two statutes, but also in that § 16600 would essentially 
nullify the remedial structure of the MOVE Act within California. The 
Supremacy Clause requires federal law be the supreme law of the land. 
Therefore, the MOVE Act would preempt § 16600. 
